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statute of the domciliary state, is the view of the Court of
Appeals. 9
Generally speaking, a marriage will be recognized in the
state where it is solemnized although it was entered into
in violation of a prohibition in a divorce decree granted in
another state. 0 Obviously, however, the marriage could not
be recognized as valid if under the statute of the other state
the prior marriage was deemed not to be dissolved until
the expiration of a waiting period. 1 The usual rule seems
to be that in the absence of a statute of the domiciliary state
expressly regulating marriage abroad, the statute of the
place where it is solemnized governs the validity of the
marriage, unless held to be odious to public policy,52 but a
it is solemnized will not be
marriage that is void where
5
recognized in another states.

UNILATERAL MISTAKE AS DEFENSE TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE - MEASURE OF DAMAGES
RECOVERABLE BY VENDEE AT LAW
Kappelman v. Bowie'
Defendants-appellees, husband and wife, with little education or business experience, signed a standard multiple
listing contract with a real estate broker, authorizing the
sale of property for $9,500, subject to a $90 ground rent to
be created; the property had cost them $8,500 and they had
spent some $2,000 in repairs and improvements. Subsequently, they were told by an agent of the broker that they
would have to take less money to secure a cash sale. Thereafter the agent submitted an offer to buy in fee for $7,500
cash, in the form of a standard contract prepared by the
11See the Maryland case of Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 29 A. 2d
287 (1942), noted in 7 Md. L. Rev. 254 (1943), which shows the willingness of the Court of Appeals to apply these principles.
10In re Ommang's Estate, 183 Minn. 92, 235 N. W. 529 (1931), criticized
in 16 Minn. L. Rev. 172, 184 (1932). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws
(1934), Sec. 13L illustration 2, which would decide the first point in the
instant case the other way.
61Johnson v. State Compensation Commissioner, 116 W. Va. 232, 179
S. E. 814 (1935).
v. Earle, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N. Y. Supp. 317 (1910).
2Earle
Huard v. MeTeigh, 8upra, n. 43.
201 Md. 86, 93 A. 2d 266 (1952).
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agent, which defendants read and signed after making and
initialing certain minor alterations. Defendants testified
that they thought the price was to be $7,500 subject to a
ground rent to be created, that at the time of signing they
asked the agent about the ground rent, and that he replied:
"That will be taken care of." The buyer's bill for specific
performance was dismissed in the lower court, on the
ground that the price was grossly inadequate, the chancellor making no finding on the question of mistake. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was a unilateral mistake on the part of the defendants which, under
all the circumstances of the case and coupled with gross inadequacy of consideration, constituted a defense to specific
performance.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals emphasized the defendants' lack of education and business experience and
said that in dealing with the experienced agent of an established real estate concern they "placed reliance upon one
who stood in a confidential relationship to them". In consequence, when told by him that the ground rent would be
"taken care of", it was not unnatural for them to assume
that the ground rent would be created before the settlement was put through. Though the mistake was the defendants' own and one induced by their own agent, to which
the plaintiff had in no way contributed and with which he
was in no way chargeable, this did not prevent the defendants from setting it up as a defense. The plaintiff's contention to the contrary, said the Court,
.. . overlooks the true basis for the rule, which is
rooted in the proposition that equity may refuse the
extraordinary remedy of specific performance where to
do so would enforce a hard bargain, at least where the
mistaken party was not grossly negligent and the
opposite party would not be prejudiced except to the
extent of losing a windfall."2
Under what circumstances will specific performance of
a contract to sell land be denied because of the defendants'
unilateral mistake? If denied, what is the measure of plaintiff's recovery at law? Inadequacy of the legal remedy is
ordinarily assumed. As the Court of Appeals has stated:
"While... an application for specific performance
is always addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
yet where a contract respecting real estate is in writing
Ibid, 90.
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and is in its nature and circumstances unobjectionable,
it is... a matter of course... to decree a specific per-

formance .... ."I
Ev en so, equitable relief in such a case is not an absolute
right, but is one which may be denied, in the sound discretion of the court, if the result would be inequitable or if
the case is characterized by features precluding equitable
relief.
Even though the plaintiff's conduct has not been such as
to cause him to be refused a judgment for damages or such
as to entitle the defendants to any affirmative relief against
him, it may be such as to cause the remedy of specific performance to be denied him. If a contract has been induced
by misrepresentation (even though innocent), or mistake,
or if the consideration is grossly inadequate, or enforcement will cause unreasonable hardship, specific enforcement thereof may be refused.' But its refusal as well as its
granting is in the sound discretion of the court, and the
question is one where the traditional discretionary powers
of the equity courts have particularly persisted with no
very definite principles governing their exercise.
Where the mistake of the defendants has been caused
by misrepresentations or conduct of the plaintiff, relief by
way of specific performance is in general refused, at least
where any appreciable hardship would result to the defendants from enforcement. This is true, although the plaintiff may not have been guilty of any fraud or sharp practice
or may have made misrepresentations in all good faith.'
Here the reasoning is that it is inequitable for the plaintiff
to seek enforcement of a contract which he has obtained
only as a result of a mistake by the defendants which he
himself has caused or contributed to; the plaintiff in such
circumstances is not doing equity when he seeks it. The
defendants' mistake, however, to be effective as a defense
in this type of case, must have come as a result of his
reliance upon the plaintiff's representations or conduct,
and must be material in the sense that damage or hardship
will result;' otherwise there is no inequity on the plaintiff's
' Budacz v. Fradkin, 146 Md. 400, 407, 126 A. 220 (1924).
' RsTATEMNT, CONTRAOTS (1932), Sec. 367, Comment (a).
5 Ginther v. Townsend, 114 Md. 122, 78 A. 908 (1910) ; Crane v. Judik, 86
Md. 63, 38 A. 129 (1897); Newman v. Johnson, 108 Md. 367, 70 A. 116
(1908) ; Gordon v. Gross, 141 Md. 490, 119 A. 267 (1922) ; McLaughlin v.
Leonhardt, 113 Md. 261, 77 A. 647 (1910) ; Ellicott v. White, 43 Md. 145
(1875).
"Lueas v. Long, 125 Md. 420, 94 A. 12 (1915).
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part, in the absence of fraud or sharp practice, when he
seeks to enforce his contract.
Where, however, the defendants' mistake is in no way
caused by nor chargeable to the plaintiff, the reasons stated
above for denying him relief in equity when his legal
remedy is inadequate lose much of their force. The instant
case is of this type; the defendants' mistake was induced
not by the plaintiff, but by the defendants' own agent, for
whose disregard of duty the plaintiff, as the court recognizes, was not responsible. Furthermore, there was nothing in the instant case to show that the plaintiff was aware
of or on notice of the defendants' mistake, so as to be in
the position of having sought to take knowing advantage
thereof when he signed the contract, - a circumstance
which has sometimes been relied upon as a reason for denying equitable relief.7
It is nevertheless well established that here too specific
performance may be refused, if to grant it would cause
undue hardship to the defendants.' The plaintiff may still
be regarded as acting inequitably and be remitted to his
legal remedy when he seeks the benefit of a contract which
he has obtained as a result of mistake on the defendants'
part, the enforcement of which will be harsh as against the
defendants, even though there has been "more or less negligence" in the defendants." Since here the plaintiff has
neither induced the defendants' mistake nor knowingly
sought to take advantage of it, his inequity in seeking to
enforce the contract would seem to be simply in seeking
the benefit of a bargain which would work a hardship
against the defendants. °
vSee e.g., Webster v. Cecil, 30 Beav. 62, 54 Eng. Rep. 812 (1861) ; Mansfield v. Sherman, 81 Me. 365, 17 A. 300 (1889). Of. Samuel v. Cityco Co.,
141 Md. 27, 118 A. 124 (1922).
8 See, in addition to the instant case, Diffenderfer v. Knoche, 118 Md. 189,
84 A. 416 (1912) ; Henneke v. Cooke, 135 Md. 417, 109 A. 113 (1919) ; Somerville v. Coppage, 101 Md. 519, 61 A. 318 (1905).
Henneke v. Cooke, 8upra, n. 8; Samuel v. Cityco Co., supra, n. 7. But the
defendant's negligence may sometimes cause specific performance to be
granted, particularly if the hardship is not excessive. See Tamplin v. James,
15 Ch. Div. 215 (1879), and cf. Kalis v. Shor, 193 Md. 643, 69 A. 2d 486
(1949), where it was said that a purchaser of leasehold property had "no
right" to assume that the ground rent on the property was redeemable without making inquiry and specific performance was granted. If the plaintiff's
position has changed, this will also cause specific performance to be granted,
the defendant being estopped to urge his mistake as a defense; see Trotter
v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A. 2d 329 (1946), and Samuel v. Cityco Co., supra,
n. 7.

'0In POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS, (3rd Ed., 1926), Sec.
245, Note 1(a), it is pointed out that cases where specific performance is
denied because of the defendant's own mistake are those in which considerable hardship would result if specific performance were decreed.
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Hardship that is merely the result of the defendants'
own improvidence in making a bad bargain is not, however, ordinarily a defense to specific performance. Inadequacy of consideration without more, unless so gross as to
shock the chancellor's conscience, will not prevent equitable relief. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals agreed
with the lower court that the price was "grossly inadequate", but went on to say:
"Mere inadequacy of price is, of course, not a sufficient ground for denying specific performance, but it
may be considered in connection with other grounds
of equitable relief.""
Presumably then, except for the defendants' mistake in
supposing that they were selling subject to a ground rent
to be created, specific performance would have been
granted, in spite of the inadequacy of the contract price.
Neither the mistake without the hardship, nor the hardship without the mistake would have defeated the plaintiff.
If there would have been no inequity on the plaintiff's
part in seeking to enforce the contract in the instant case,
in spite of the inadequacy of the price, in the absence of
the defendants' mistake, it is not altogether apparent why
it becomes any more inequitable for him to do so with that
element added, when he was neither responsible for nor
aware of the mistake. Perhaps it is felt that the hardship
to the defendants is greater where he has not only contracted to sell for an inadequate price but has done so under
the mistaken supposition that he was to get more. It may
be argued too that the defendants who with full knowledge
agrees to sell for an inadequate price is estopped to urge
as a defense the hardship resulting to him from enforcement. And where, as in the instant case, the defendants are
inexperienced in business dealings and poorly educated,
this has not infrequently been a factor of some influence
in causing specific enforcement to be denied. 2
While, however, unilateral mistake of the defendants
may be a defense to specific performance, denial of equitable relief does not necessarily mean that the defendants are
absolved from liability under his contract. The plaintiff
may still have his remedy at law. In Ray v. Eurice,'13 deSupra, n. 1, 91.
See e.g., Gordon v. Gross, supra, n. 5; Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass.
46, 85 N. E. 839 (1908); Friend v. Lamb, 152 Pa. 529, 25 A. 577 (1893) ;
Kelley v. York Cliffs Imp. Co., 94 Me. 374, 47 A. 898 (1900) ; Shoop v. Burnside, 78 Kan. 871, 98 P. 202 (1908).
201 Md. 115, 93 A. 2d 272 (1952).
12
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cided at the same term as the instant case, it was held that
an alleged mistake by a defendant contracting to construct
a house as to the specifications and plans embodied in the
contract could not be set up as a defense in a suit at law
for breach of contract by the owner of the premises, the
Court saying:
"The law is clear, absent fraud, duress or mutual
mistake, that one having the capacity to understand a
written document who reads and signs it... is bound
by his signature in law, at least.... In Maryland there
may be exceptions in procedings for specific performance, but otherwise the rule is in accord."' 4
Assuming then that in the instant case, the plaintiff,
although denied relief in equity, could recover at law in a
suit for breach of contract, what would be the measure of
damages recoverable?
The general rule in a suit by the buyer of land for damages for total breach of contract by the seller, was stated
as follows in Hartsock v. Mort,15 quoting the Michigan case
of Hammond v. Hannin:16
" 'If the vendor acts in bad faith, - as, if having
title he refuses to convey, or disables himself from conveying, - the proper measure of damages is the value
of the land at the time of the breach; the rule, in such
case, being the same in relation to real as to personal
property. But, on the other hand, if the contract of
sale was made in good faith, and the vendor for any
reason is unable to perform it, and is guilty of no fraud,
the clear weight of authority is that the vendee is
limited in his recovery to the consideration money
(paid) and interest, with perhaps in addition, the costs
of investigating the title'."1 7
This is the so-called "English" rule, first laid down in
Flureau v. Tharnhill,5 which makes the amount recoverable by the buyer depend upon whether the defendant has
acted in "good" or "bad" faith. Under the so-called "AmeriIbid, 125-126.
76 Md. 281, 288-289, 25 A. 303 (1892).
21 Mich. 374, 887 (1870).
"That costs of investigating title are recoverable was specifically held in
Baltimore Permanent Build. & Land Society v. Smith, 54 Md. 187 (1880).
In Markoff v. Kreiner, 180 Md. 150, 23 A. 2d 19 (1941), recovery for expenditures in improving the property, made in good faith by the purchaser,
was allowed.
22
Black. W. 1078,96 Eng. Rep. 635 (1776).
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can" rule, followed in about half of the states, the buyer's
measure of damages would in either case be the difference
between the contract price and the market value of the
land at the agreed time for conveyance, plus any payments
made.' 9 The principal justifications for the English rule
limiting the buyer, where the seller has acted in good faith,
to the recovery of the deposit paid with interest and reimbursement of expenses, have been said to be (1) the difficulty of estimating the lost profit, the "market value" of
land being at best an uncertain standard, and (2) the hardship which the usual rule would impose on the seller, in
view of the uncertainties involved in real estate titles and
the fact that contracts to sell land are usually entered without a preliminary study of the title.2"
Therefore, whether the vendee in the instant case, if he
had brought suit at law, could have recovered the difference between the contract price and the market value of
the land plus any payments made, or whether he would
be limited to the return of any payments made plus interest
and expenses - that is to say, the amount recoverable on
a rescission - would depend upon whether the vendors'
conduct would be regarded as acting in "good" or "bad"
faith.
The statement quoted above from Hartsock v. Mort2
would seem to limit cases of "good" faith to those where
the defendant is as a practical matter unable to perform
and is without fault or fraud. Acting in "bad" faith would
seem to mean no more than a refusal to perform when able
to do so. Even where defendant lacked title, the property
belonging to his wife, it was held in Homer v. Beasley22 that
the measure of damages should be based on the value of
the land, since it appeared that the wife would have conveyed to the vendee if requested to do so by defendant.
By this test, the refusal of the defendants to convey in
the instant case when able to do so would seem to constitute bad faith and in a suit for damages they would have
been liable not only for the return of any deposit money
but for the difference between the contract price and the
market value of the land. If so, the question arises whether
refusal of the equity court to decree specific performance
against them, because of the hardship which to do so would
entail, has actually been particularly beneficial to the defen19See MCCORMICK, DAMAGES (1935), 680-686.

20Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Intere8t in Contract Damages, 46 Yale
L. J. 373, 377 (1937).
2Supra,n. 15.
105 Md. 193, 65 A. 820 (1907).
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dants. They have been relieved of the hardship of having
to convey at an inadequate price, but how does this benefit
them if they must pay out as damages the difference between that price and the market value of the property? As
Dean Pound has said:
"There is a hard and fast rule that certain bargains
are 'hard' and that equity will not enforce them. In
states where the value of the bargain may be recovered
at law, it may well be sometimes that the bargain
might as well be enforced in equity if it is not to be
canceled. But the chancellor is not unlikely to wash
his hands of a hard case, saying that the court of law
is more callous; let that court act, although that court
is the same judge with another docket before him."23
24
It should be noted, however, that in Markoff v. Kreiner,
the Court of Appeals stated that the measure of damages
for a vendor's breach of contract for the sale of real estate
is "ordinarily" the purchase money paid under the terms
of the contract - a statement inconsistent with those in
earlier cases that "where a party fails to perform his contract to convey land, the true measure of damages is the
value of the land at the time of the breach of the covenant."
The Court in Markoff v. Kreiner cites Homer v.
Beasley2 6 as authority for its statement, but that case not
27
only reiterated the rule laid down in Hartsock v. Mort,
making the measure of damages depend upon whether the
defendant acted in good or bad faith, but in fact, as stated
above, held the defendant liable for the excess of the
market value of the property over the contract price in
addition to the amount of the deposit paid on account of the
contract. The statement in the Markoff case is made in connection with holding that expenditures made by the buyer
by way of improvements on the property were recoverable,
and it is not believed that the Court intended to state a rule
as to the measure of damages different from that of the
Hartsock and Homer cases.2"
" POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PMLOSOPHY OF LAW (1922), 132.

Supra, n. 17.
Clagett v. Easterday, 42 Md. 617, 628 (1875). Similar statements are
found in Cannell v. McLean, 6 H. & J. 297, 302 (1825), and Marshall v.
Haney, 9 Gill. 251, 260 (1850), 4 Md. 498, 508 (1853).
Supra, n. 22.
Supra, n. 15.
2In
Wlodarek v. Thrift, 178 Md. 453, 468, 13 A. 2d 774 (1940), a case involving liability of an attorney for negligence in searching title, it was said
that the buyer's damages would ordinarily include the purchase price paid
with interest, which is entirely consistent with the Hartsock and Horner
cases.
2

